Hermógenes Oliveira
I am a philosopher and logician. Initially, I set up this page in order to make some papers available to the general public without having to wait for the embargo period imposed by the self-archiving policies of some publishers (these publishers impose an embargo on repositories but allow you to distribute copies through a personal web page immediately). Other miscellaneous pieces that I thought could be of general interest also found their home here (because I didn't know of more appropriate, impersonal, places to publish them at the time). Since then, some of the material available in this page have made their way into repositories or other venues. Still, I let them be, so as to avoid breaking links and search results. This page is not a CV with a complete list of my works (academic or otherwise), scientific interests and talks. Although, for the inquisitive people out there, a little more information can be gathered from these profiles: PhilPeople, ORCID, arXiv, StackExchange, GitLab and OGS.
Academic Publications
Papers
On Dummett's Verificationist Justification Procedure
(Final Draft, published in Synthese, Vol. 193, Issue 8)
(jointly with Wagner de Campos Sanz)
Abstract: We examine the proof-theoretic verificationist justification procedure proposed by Michael Dummett. After some scrutiny, two distinct interpretations with respect to bases are advanced: the independent and the dependent interpretation. We argue that both are unacceptable as a semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0865-3
Master's Dissertation:
Investigations on Proof-Theoretic Semantics (PDF)
Abstract: Proof-theoretic Semantics provides a new approach to the semantics of logical constants. It has compelling philosophical motivations which are rooted deeply in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics. We investigate this new approach of logical semantics and its perspective on logical validity in the light of its own philosophical aspirations, especially as represented by the work of Michael Dummett. Among our findings, we single out the validity of Peirce's rule with respect to a justification procedure based on the introduction rules for the propositional logical constants. This is an undesirable outcome since Peirce's rule is not considered to be constructively acceptable. On the other hand, we also establish the invalidity of the same inference rule with respect to a justification procedure based on the elimination rules for the propositional logical constants. We comment on the implications of this scenario to Dummett's philosophical programme and to proof-theoretic semantics in general.